

Nigeria's Foreign Policy Goals in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

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Abstract: In line with its foreign policy objectives, Nigeria, since its independence, has been participating in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in Africa. It was in recognition of the country's commitment to the United Nations' (UN) objectives of maintaining peace and security that made it contribute troops to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) for the first time in 1960. For more than fifty years, Nigeria has continued to make giant strides and commitment in this regard. This paper examines the benefits it derives from participating in PKOs in Africa under the UN, OAU (now AU) and the ECOMOG. Using both primary and secondary data, the paper argues that a normative anxiety was the primary motivating factor for Nigeria's involvement in PKOs in Africa. This is driven by the idiosyncrasies of the country's leaders since its independence in 1960. Nigeria's decision-makers are confident that its participation in PKOs serves a number of foreign policy goals and provides for the nation's interests. The effort promotes the country's prestige and influence in the comity of nations and in Intergovernmental Organisations (the UN, AU and ECOWAS).

Keywords: Nigeria, Foreign Policy, Idiosyncrasies, Normative, Peace, Peacekeeping Operation

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Abstrak: Selaras dengan objektif dasar luarnya, Nigeria telah menyertai Operasi Pengaman (OP) di Afrika semenjak beroleh kemerdekaan. Sebagai pengiktirafan ke atas komitmen negara tersebut terhadap objektif Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB) dalam mengekalkan keamanan dan keselamatan, Nigeria telah menyumbang angkatan tentera terhadap Operasi PBB di Kongo (ONUC) buat julung kali pada tahun 1960. Selama lebih daripada lima puluh tahun, Nigeria secara berterusan mengambil langkah-langkah besar dan kekal komited dalam hal ini. Artikel ini meneliti manfaat yang diperolehi oleh Nigeria daripada penyertaannya dalam OP di Afrika di bawah PBB, Organisasi Kesatuan Afrika (kini dikenali sebagai Kesatuan Afrika-KA) dan Komuniti Ekonomi Kumpulan Pemantau Negara-Negara Afrika Barat (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group-ECOMOG). Berdasarkan kedua-dua data primer dan sekunder, artikel ini menghujahkan bahawa kebimbangan normatif merupakan faktor utama bagi penglibatan Nigeria dalam OP di Afrika. Ini didorong oleh idiosinkrasi para pemimpin negara semenjak mencapai kemerdekaan pada 1960. Mereka yakin bahawa penyertaan dalam OP membantu dalam mencapai matlamat dasar luar serta kepentingan negara. Usaha ini juga membantu mempromosikan prestij serta pengaruh negara tersebut dalam konteks rasa hormat sesama negara serta dalam organisasi antarabangsa (PBB, KA dan ECOWAS).

Kata Kunci: Nigeria, Dasar Luar, Idiosinkrasi, Normatif, Keamanan, Operasi Pengaman

1.0 Introduction

Nigeria has been participating in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) since becoming the ninety ninth member of the United Nations (UN) on 1st October, 1960. The first participation was when it sent two battalions comprising engineers, signals and medical service components to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Congo). Since then, Nigeria has continued to send its military personnel to PKOs across the globe, particularly in Africa, under the auspices of international, regional and sub-regional organisations (the UN, AU and ECOWAS). Nigeria has, among others, participated in PKOs in Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Darfur, Liberia, and East Timor (Sanda, 2010; Abdulwaheed, 2012; Adebajo, 2013).

What are the motivating factors for Nigeria to participate in PKOs in Africa? What interests does Nigeria intend to advance through its engagement in PKOs in Africa? This article aims to analyse the national

interests Nigeria seeks to pursue through its active participation in PKOs in Africa. This article will be divided into five sections – this section being the introduction, followed by the section on the theoretical discourse on the rationales behind a nation's involvement in PKOs. The third section will look at the background of Nigeria's contribution to PKOs in Africa, followed by the fourth section which discusses the rationales behind Nigeria's participation in PKOs in Africa. The last section will be the conclusion.

2.0 Theoretical discourse on rationales behind a nation's involvement in PKOs

According to Gambari (2010), peacekeeping has become a real instrument of foreign policy, an accent of the imperative to deter acts that threaten a country's security, peace and development, as well as to increase the influence of a nation and demonstrate its capability in the comity of nations. Scholars and political analysts provide various definitions of the term 'peacekeeping' depending on different contexts and viewpoints. The term peacekeeping was coined in the 1950s due to the failure of the UN Collective Security doctrine. Since then, governments and different international organisations have continued to describe different kinds of military activities as 'peacekeeping' for them to legitimise their operations in foreign territories.

According to Ghali (1996), PKO stands out as one of the UN's original and ambitious undertakings in its efforts to control conflicts and promote peace, and later carried out by regional organisations (cited in Sitkowski, 2006). The operation could be carried out under bilateral or multilateral arrangements with the aim of tempering a conflict situation by freezing hostilities between the parties. PKO, as an alternative to the UN collective security doctrine, has been described by Durch (1993), as "carving out a more narrow security role" to encourage the parties through the institutional framework provided by the authorising body to solve their differences using negotiation (Ibid). It has been further observed that, of recent, "PKOs have come to have significant civilian components such as human rights, election monitors, disarmament, demobilisation and demining groups respectively, and providing assistance to civil administration, appropriate law enforcement institutions, as well as humanitarian operations by different international

and non-governmental organisations” (Oakley 1999). These activities are known as “multidimensional peacekeeping”.

Onoja (1996) further describes PKO as an essential mechanism developed by the UN to contain and confront armed conflicts and to facilitate their resolution by peaceful means. Peacekeeping, therefore, has become an instrument or mechanism through which the UN and other regional organisations exercise their role in maintaining international peace and security. In other words, PKO is “one of the novel techniques of conflict and diplomacy” that is recognised globally for maintaining peace and security even though there is still no consensus on the mode and kind of operation that is accepted by the great powers. Sorenson and Wood (2005) opine that PKO is known as a generic term that encompasses all the variations of what is termed both as first-generation and second-generation operations which could either be UN controlled or sponsored PKOs, or UN-mandated PKOs (controlled by a coalition of states with the authorisation of the UN Security Council). They further argue that the military, political, social and humanitarian activities within the current PKO is inimical to the already known traditional UN PKOs.

Despite its extensive application, peacekeeping as a conflict control measure was not foreseen by the founders of the UN, and therefore not reflected in the theoretical substructure of the organisation. PKO, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as a means through which participating countries and the armed forces in particular, benefit economically through the UN compensation system for the participating countries because, whether the contributing state were to go for that reason or not, it will get such compensation based on the UN specification (Safiyanu and Roy, 2018). Institutionally, it is an opportunity to get invaluable overseas experience for the personnel concerned and improve their training and institutional arrangement. Not only this, peacekeeping is considered as a way of keeping the armed forces occupied outside the countries rather than meddling in domestic politics, or for rehabilitating them after a period of authoritarian rule. Peacekeeping participation in the developing world, especially for African nations, is a means of providing the armed forces with a prestigious post-cold war position which also prevents them from full exposure to a more famous series of cuts in the budget brought by the post-cold war peace dividend, and

general peacekeeping has been a tool for achieving foreign policy goals for many countries.

There are many theoretical discourses that tend to explain the reasons countries are involved in PKOs. These theoretical discourses revolve around political, economic, normative and idiosyncratic factors.

2.1 Political factor

Political reasons include seeking recognition and getting credibility in the comity of the nation, or even getting credibility for candidature in future reforms of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Many governments in the world have made tremendous efforts to ensure global peace and security. Thus, the promotion of peace has been made part of their foreign policies. Nations seek to realise their political interests, such as securing membership of the UNSC through their involvement in PKOs, which they feel may likely to be achieved due to their contribution to international peace and security (Gambari, 2004; Kuna, 2005; Sanda, 2010).

2.2 Economic interests

Economic interests are also part of the principal motives behind nations' decisions to participate in PKOs. The existence of significant economic interests of the participating state may likely propel the country to participate more in such missions. Trade and investment relations are particularly significant in making countries participate in PKOs (Ko, 2015). Thus, states are more likely to engage in PKOs if such action will create a peaceful and conducive environment for pursuing their economic interests. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the attractive remunerations offered to the personnel also plays a role in their decision.

The 1990s saw increased involvement of many countries, including China, in PKOs in many parts of the world. China's primary concern was to secure natural resources of the country it intervened in, and to propel economic investments which were essential to stabilise its economic development. For countries like China and the USA, peacekeeping contributions may position their multinational corporations in better positions to participate in post-conflict economic reconstruction as soon as the conflicts come to an end (Li and Dottin, 2011). For instance, when the UNSC authorised the deployment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005, Chinese trade with this country rose to about

USD4 billion, almost four times its value in the year 2000 (Cotter, 2008). This situation explains why China had participated actively in UNMIS - deploying troops and providing aid. The Chinese government has remained supportive of the UNMIS Mission successor in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It was also committed to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) missions to Sudan, using its veto power to block economic sanctions against Khartoum.

Remuneration is another important economic factor that makes some developing countries deploy their military personnel for PKOs. From the Asian continent, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal have deployed considerable contingents of more than 6,000 to PKO troops. The PKO remuneration paid by the UN for the troops' expenses is a strong incentive for these countries. Many countries are keen to send troops to collect the UN salary rate of more than USD1000 per month (Aning, 2013). Furthermore, developing countries' participation in PKOs becomes a form of cheap wage labour exports as income from allowances paid to the troops and other civilian components in PKOs have become an important source of revenue which enhances the life of the participants. The importance of such remuneration is evidenced by the intense lobbying by soldiers and police officers for peacekeeping duties in many developing countries. This generous reward system creates a division of labour between less developed countries which contribute the majority of troops, and developed countries which shoulder the costs of the missions.

2.3 Normative reasons

PKOs is no doubt a costly business that requires significant material investments. For example, in 2009, the deployment of 124,000 UN personnel who served in sixteen PKOs cost USD7.9 billion, and the lopsidedness in the cost distribution among the international community is quite disturbing, with only five contributors paying 63% of the total UN PKOs budget, and with only 11 states contributing 82% of the peacekeepers (UN, fact sheet, 2010). The interests of the few countries that pay for most of the missions' costs may play a vital role in influencing the UN's decision on the part of the world to which peacekeepers should be deployed (Mingst, 2003). Many of the states with self-images as 'global good samaritans', 'good international citizens', or as a

member of the 'non-aligned' groups of states that support the UN as an alternative to the great power hegemony, do participate in PKOs on the basis of normative reasons. These countries participate or contribute to PKOs based on the belief that such is the right thing to do (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Another reason that could be a motivating factor is the commitment to protect lives especially that of civilians.

2.4 Idiosyncratic factor

Idiosyncratic factor is another strong reason that influences the decision of a country to contribute to PKOs. This is common to countries where political leaders are powerful than the state itself (Mashishi, 2003). This mostly happens in African countries where there is an absent of rule of law due to military rule or bad governance. Such countries include Libya under the late Muammar Gaddafi, Nigeria mostly under its various military leaders, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and many others. Most of these leaders, whether military dictators or civilians, epitomise the state itself. Sesay (n.d) succinctly summarises this in the following:

“African leaders are the state in their respective countries. As such, even major policy decisions could be made merely to satisfy these leaders' whims and caprices, no matter what the long-term consequences might be for the state and its citizens. The situation is exacerbated in crisis periods and under military dictatorships, because relatively little or no time exists for broad-based consultations” (cited in Mashishi, 2003; p. 18).

Therefore, to understand the motivation of a country's commitment to PKOs, one must include not only the traditional national security rhetoric, but also the personal interests and motivation of African leaders who are only very lightly constrained, if at all, by state institutions (Mashishi, 2003).

The above discussion can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

Figure 1.01: Diagrammatical Representation of Theoretical Discourse on Rationales for Participation in Peacekeeping Operations

Political Factors	Economic Factors	Normative Factors	Idiosyncrasies/ Interests
Prestige	Remuneration	Moral Leadership	Leaders' Personalities
Influence	Investment	Historical Burden	Self-Image
Image	Trade	Public Opinion	Leaders' Place in History

Source: Compiled by the Authors

3.0 Background of Nigeria's Contribution to Peacekeeping Activities in Africa

Nigerian military engagement started before its independence - on 20th February 1948, when a rally was staged by the Ghanaian Ex-Service Union in Accra. The rally degenerated into a large unsettling influence, inundating a few towns and urban communities. The Ghanaian military and police were overpowered by the emergency to the degree that outer fortification was required. Deployed by the British colonial government, it took the Nigerian troops four months to restore peace to the then Gold Coast (Abdurrahman, 2005).

Since its independence, Nigeria has continued to actively be involved in the management of international peace. The action becomes possible as it is in tandem with its foreign policy objectives which have been defined within the context of its national interests. This can also be confirmed by the statement made by the then Nigerian Prime Minister – Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who informed the world through the UN General Assembly that Nigeria was devoted to safeguarding the principles upon which the UN was founded. He further reiterated Nigeria's willingness to work with African states or any other nations outside the continent to assist in the progress of Africa, and bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence (Abubakar, 1960; p.1). This statement demonstrated Nigeria's commitment and willingness towards bringing about cooperation, progress and promotion of international peace and security. This view was reinforced by Chief

Jaja Nwachukwu (1960), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he revealed Nigeria's intention to see African states living in peace and harmony, and not Africa that will continue to live under the domination of whatever forms or to continue in peace, not in pieces. The country had faith in the integration of all African states. To him "pan-Africanism was no longer merely a theory; it is a fact..." (cited in Onoja, L.A., 1996; p.12).

Nigeria itself has suffered many crises despite the fact that the government has remained focused on PKOs within the region. Nigeria has contributed immensely to PKOs around the globe and in Africa in particular, earning it recognition for its readiness and commitment. Since its involvement in "Operations des Nations Unies a Congo" (ONUC) in 1960 a few days after gaining independence, Nigeria has been sending troops to PKOs on bilateral and multilateral courses of action under the AU, the ECOWAS and the UN in African countries such as Chad, Angola, Namibia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan (Darfur), Liberia, Sierra Leone and many others (see Tables 2). Nigeria has also additionally partaken in Observer Missions and has since been expanding its military, civilian and police components as part of the country's growing commitment to the UN, the AU and the ECOMOG in guaranteeing peace and security throughout the world (Alli, 2012).

Nigeria's participation in PKOs in the Congo provided the test of Nigerian policy in Africa (Izah, 1991), although some scholars are of the view that Nigeria found itself in international politics with a rude shock as it was being called upon to decide on a main African issue when even the debate on its general foreign policy statement had not been concluded. Nevertheless, the Congo PKO provided Nigeria with the opportunity to re-emphasise the fundamental principle of respect for the existing boundaries in Africa (Izah, 1991). Similarly, Okoosi-Simbine's (2004) argues that the Congo operation had put Nigeria on the world map, earning it recognition and respect right from the beginning.

Similarly, Nigeria's commitment to PKOs could be viewed as an expansion of its support for the struggle for national freedom on the continent as evidenced by the anti-apartheid dimension of the campaign after the crumple of the Portuguese provincial domain in Africa, particularly with the coming to power of General Murtala /General Obasanjo in 1975, and the subsequent regimes. The dedication was to a

great extent, exhibited through diplomatic efforts and material support for different national freedom movements throughout the continent. Nigeria's engagement in regional security and conflict resolution in general has earned the country the status of a 'Frontline State' (Alli, 2012).

Nigeria's prowess and experience in PKOs speak volumes about the capacity and the capability of its troops to perform efficiently and professionally at flash points of crises. Nigeria's position in sub-Saharan Africa and in the African region at large makes it mandatory for the country to show a keen interest in the activities of the AU member states (Oyinlola, 2005). Even though the country's peacekeeping efforts constitute wasteful exercises of enormous resources, the critical and rational examination of the motives reveals that it is better to intervene in war situations to prevent the possible spread of its attendant consequences to other locations. Nigeria has occupied a sensitive position as an undisputable leader in the African continent, and as such, Nigeria could not neglect the West-African Sub-Region or Africa in general by failing to act decisively when it is supposed to do so. Nigeria's commitment to PKOs in Africa, even during her trying times, has portrayed it as a peace-loving and responsible nation with purposeful leaders who are committed to global peace and global socio-economic development.

Following the outbreak of the crisis in Chad in the 1970s which subsequently worsened in 1980, Nigeria initiated peace summits in Kano between March and April 1979, and later on, commenced a PKO. Kingibe (2009) reveals that Nigeria was outmanoeuvred by the French in its effort, and with the increasing support received by Habre from the US, Nigeria was forced to withdraw its troops in 1982 without achieving the set goal. To him, Nigeria did not understand that US interests were different from its own. The US was more concerned with Libyan expansionism, and therefore, seemed more comfortable with Habre in power (Cited in Okolie, 2010, p.102). The Chadian operation was the first case of sub-regional peacekeeping carried out by Nigeria and the action has defined Nigeria's image as a major contributor to global security (Okolie, 2010).

Table 2: United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations in Africa 1990-2015

<i>S/ No.</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Size (Approximate)</i>	<i>Main Task (S)</i>
1.	MINURSO	Western Sahara	1991-	237	Peacekeeping
2.	UNAVEM 2	Angola	1991-1995	475	Observation
3.	UNISOM 1	Somalia	1992-1993	4,270	Peacekeeping
4.	UNAMOZ	Muzambique	1992-1994	8,125	Peacebuilding
5.	UNISOM 2	Somalia	1993-1995	28,000	Peacebuilding/ Enforcement
6.	UNAMUR	Rwanda/ Uganda	1993-1994	81	Observation
7.	UNOMSIL	Liberia	1993-1997	365	Observation
8.	UNAMIR 1and2	Rwanda	1993-1996	5,500	Peacebuilding
9.	OMIB	Burundi	1993-1996	47	Observation
10.	UNASOG	Chad/Libya	1994-	9	Observation
11.	UNAVEM 3	Angola	1995-1997	4,220	Peacebuilding
12.	MONUA	Angola	1997-1999	3,000	Peacebuilding
13.	MINURCA	CAR	1998-2000	1,350	Peacebuilding
14.	UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	1998-1999	352	Peacebuilding
15.	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999-2005	17,670	Peacebuilding/ Enforcement/Civil Protection
16.	MONUC	DRC	1999-	18,600	Peacebuilding/ Enforcement/Civil Protection
17.	UNMEE	Ethiopia/ Eritrea	2000-2008	4,200	Peacekeeping
18.	MINUCI	Code d'Ivoire	2003-2004	75	Observation
19.	UNMIL	Liberia	2003-	16,100	Peacebuilding/ Civilian protection
20.	MINUCI	Code d'Ivoire	2004-	19,200	Peacebuilding/ Enforcement/Civil Protection

21.	ONUB	Burundi	2004-2006	6,100	Peacebuilding/ Enforcent/Civil Protection
22.	UNMIS	Sudan	2005-2011	10,100	Peacebuilding/ Enforcent/Civil Protection
23.	MINURCAT	CAR/Chad	2007-2008	3,000	Civil Protection /Humanitarian Assistance
24.	UNAMID	Dafur/Sudan	2007-present	20,616	Peacekeeping/ Civil Protection
25.	UNMISS	Southern Sudan	2011-present	16,147	Peacekeeping/ Humanitarian Assistance
26.	MONUSCO	Congo	2010-present	22,498	Peacekeeping
27.	UNMISS	Southern Sudan	2011-present	16,147	Peacekeeping/ Humanitarian Assistance
28.	UNISFA	Abyei/Sudan	2011-present	4,778	Peacekeeping
29.	MINUSMA	Mali	2013-present	13,083	Peacekeeping
30.	MINUSCA	CAR	2014-present	13,327	Peacekeeping/ Civil Protection/ Humanitarian Assistance

Source: Adapted and updated from Williams, (2014), p.72.

**Note: Nigeria participated in almost all these operations as troops, police, observers, the UN Secretary-General representative, Force Commander or as military advisers.*

The failure of the Chadian government to broker peace between the warring groups in the Darfur crisis corresponded with Nigeria's position as the chair of the AU (Ebgbulem, 2012). In his capacity as the Chairperson of the AU, President Obasanjo had selected a former Nigerian head of state, Abdulsalam Abubakar, as his special envoy to Chad and Sudan. The report of General Abubakar's visits to both nations served as the catalyst for facilitating peaceful negotiations by the AU which culminated in the Darfur and Abuja peace agreements (Adeniji, 2004). Indeed, even at the height of the Boko Haram rebellion in the Northeast of the country, Nigeria was among the first to deploy troops to fight against Islamic militants and to stabilise the government in Mali (Olorunlomu, 2013).

Nigeria had also participated in the PKO in Liberia. Scholars such as Levitt (2005) view the Liberian PKO as a watershed in universal peace authorisation and a real instance of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War time. Nigeria's granting asylum to Charles Taylor was considered to be among the things that had encouraged the restoration of peace in Liberia (Akinbobola and Akinyeye, 2003). The Sierra Leonean crisis which was a spillover of the war in Liberia began in March 1991 when soldiers of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) propelled an assault to oust the legislature from the east of the nation closer to the fringe of Liberia. A military upset in May 1997 prompted the toppling of the legislative assembly of President Tejan Kabbah. Despite being represented by the army at the time, Uhomoibhi describes how the role that Nigeria played in the civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone made the country universally perceived as a regional defender and chief enforcer of the constitutional order in West Africa (Uhomoibhi, 2012). In Ivory Coast, the power battle between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara worsened into road fights between their supporters after the 2000 race. Despite the fact that the UN was credited with planning the PKO from February 2004 through the UNSC determination in setting up of the UNPKO in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Nigeria managed and dictated the ECOWAS's underlying mediation (Alli, 2012).

PKOs are also said to provide a valuable profile enhancement tool for emerging powers (Tardy, 2001). For Nigeria, the need to be perceived as a 'regional power' and a 'big brother' makes it contribute to PKOs particularly in the sub-region. Nigeria's commitment to the internal security of different states is significant. Even in times of extreme domestic crisis, Nigeria has effectively taken interest in committing itself to PKOs around the world - making available men of its police, naval, military and air forces (Ekoko, 1993). The nation had the biggest troop in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and had contributed more than 12,000 men of its military to the ECOMOG PKOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Abdulrahman, 2005). The PKO in Chad (1979-82) had cost Nigeria USD82 million. It spent an average of USD1 million on ECOMOG operations per day. The 1999 estimates suggested that the nation had given USD13 billion to ECOMOG since its inception. By 2009, additionally, Nigeria had given more than 80% of ECOMOG financing for all its PKOs (Abubakar, 2009). The

deployment of Nigerian troops for the operation in Mali in January 2013 gulped USD34 million (Adigbuo, 2013).

Nigeria's overall contribution of troops to UNPKOs has been ranked fourth after Bangladesh, Pakistan and India who concurrently occupy the first three positions, respectively, in rankings for countries with the largest troop contribution to global peace. As far as PKOs are concerned, Nigeria is the leading country in the region as it contributes the bulk of the troops, financially contributing the lion's share, or playing a significant role in different capacities, and sometimes initiating the operations itself, as in Chad and Liberia.

There are a lot of lessons to be learned from Nigeria's involvement in PKOs. One of them, especially, from the Chadian PKO, is the need to not do it alone in the sub-region especially because of sensitive linguistic, colonial and geopolitical divides. The arrival of the Nigerian military planes piloted by Nigerians, landing in Chad with troops and equipment sent a powerful message to the French. The Nigerian PKO efforts in Africa were operations met with many challenges - such as obsolete equipment, poor logistics and lack of training which were made worse by language differences. Others include inadequate operational doctrines. The Liberian operation had exposed the inadequacies of battlefield necessities (such as maps, intelligence and communications equipment) (Aboagye, 1999). As foreign policy often reflects domestic policies and practices, corruption, disorganisation and poor political leadership at home were equally reflected in Nigeria's participation in PKOs.

Okolie (2010) argues that Nigeria has been ridiculed in PKOs for ill-equipping its troops and as a result, in January 2008, the UN threatened to deactivate the two Nigerian contingent (NIGCON) battalions serving in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Taiwo argues that Nigeria has been losing GBP£1.2 million monthly for deploying a battalion with below UN standards equipment for peacekeeping. An armoured personnel carrier would cost a country £6,000 per month if equipped to the UN standards (Taiwo, 2009). Despite these challenges, the Nigerian Armed Forces have taken the lead in Africa in assisting the troubled regions. The ECOMOG initiative is a case in point. Oyinlola, (2005) tries to summarise Nigeria's effort at PKO when he says:

“Nigeria’s participatory role in peacekeeping initiatives around the World and its dominant position in the West African Intervention Force in Liberia which our nation championed, are clear testimonies of our determination to assist in restoring peace in troubled regions of the world” (Oyinlola, 2005; p.27-28).

Table 3: Contribution of Nigeria’s Military Troops to Peace Operations in Africa.



Source: Compiled by the Author from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

4.0 Rationales for Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

There are several possible rationales for Nigeria’s participation in PKOs in Africa and beyond. They may be categorised into mainly economic, political, normative and idiosyncratic factors.

4.1 Economic incentives

Economic incentives in UN’s PKO deployments may sometimes be a major factor for a contributing country while using humanitarian and security factors as cover-ups. While there are many financial incentives for participating in PKOs in Africa, and Nigeria had indeed participated in the majority of UN-mandated PKOs in Africa particularly in the UN’s PKOs, remuneration has not in any way influenced Nigeria’s decision to send troops on these missions. The UN remuneration system

did partially cover Nigeria's costs to run PKOs, but unfortunately for Nigeria, it has made losses rather than recovered or made any gains from them (Tawo, 2009; Adebajo, 2013). Individual soldiers however, do benefit because the UN reimbursement is higher than an average Nigerian soldier's salary. It was reported that Nigeria had shouldered the burden of not only its troops in the PKOs of 9,000 in 1992-1993, but also for all the operational needs and allowances of all the contingents from the rest of the West African countries in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria was said to have spent USD8 billion on those two operations before the UN intervened (Saliu and Omotola, 2015: p.9).

Most of Nigeria's total expenditures on PKO missions thus far have not been reimbursed by the UN, mainly because the Nigerian Ministry of Defence had not provided its PKO troops with the requirements stipulated by the UN in the MoUs. As a result, Nigeria has been ridiculed in many of the UN PKOs and sometimes asked to withdraw from the signed agreements (Okolie, 2010). Being the richest country in the region, Nigeria has also contributed significantly in PKOs under the auspices of the AU across the continent. Nigeria is said to have spent about USD90 million in the Chad operation in the 1980s (Yoroms, 2004), and an additional sum of USD59 million when the West reneged their promise to fund and assist the mission (Jokotola, 2008). Likewise, Nigeria had also initiated and led ECOMOG operations in the West African Sub-region supplying up to 70% of the troops and financially supporting the PKO, and later peace enforcement, up to about 90% of its funding, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Abubakar, 2009).

Trade and investment may be two strong financial incentives which may have influenced the Nigerian government in sending PKO troops to other African countries. However, even though data from the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria have shown that formal economic relations between Nigeria and other African countries are of significance, Nigeria's trade volume with Africa stood at ₦71.6 billion or 3.1%, and imports from the region of ECOWAS amounted to only ₦12.6 billion (NBS, 2017; 12). The trade volume in the first quarter of 2017 with ECOWAS member countries stood at ₦12,562.0 million and the total with the rest of African nations stood at ₦71,614.7 million with Ghana, the Niger Republic and Togo as the highest receivers of Nigeria's export (NBS, 2017; 47). Ironically, there are no significant investments by Nigeria in the countries that have hosted or are still

hosting Nigeria's Peacekeepers such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Chad, Somalia and Congo. Thus, it can be said that Nigeria's PKOs activities in Africa do not reflect its trade interests as demonstrated by its export and import behaviours.

4.2 Political factor

Within the context of political considerations, Nigeria which gained independence on the 1st October 1960, immediately joined the non-alignment movement thereafter, distancing itself from any of the then two blocs of powers. By this, it decided to support the UN in its effort to maintain world peace and order. The decision to support international peace and order had enabled the country to send its Armed Forces to participate in the UN operations in 1960. This policy gained greater impetus in the 1970s when it emerged victorious from the thirty-month civil war. In the mid-1970s, Nigerian military leaders began to redefine the country's foreign policy objectives in the context of its perceived power and continental aspiration for leadership. In the 1980s, Nigeria took a unilateral action in the Chadian crisis, and when it became apparent that this would not work out, only then Nigeria put pressure on the OAU to intervene. The Chadian civil war had enabled one to watch how Nigeria changed its foreign policy instruments in a learning process to fulfil its consistent foreign policy objectives (Mays, 2010).

The country's leadership role has continued to manifest in its contributions to the development aspirations of the continent. The period between the 1980s and 1990s was a very busy one for the country's history of PKOs in Africa as Nigeria's foreign policy was preoccupied with peacekeeping at both regional and sub-regional levels. Despite the decline in its revenues and the financial crisis, Nigeria continued to maintain PKOs at high costs in terms of human and material resources. Nigeria's participation in PKOs has promoted political relations between the country and the rest of the African countries. Furthermore, Nigeria has emerged as a regional leader on the continent because of its role. Nigeria declared its readiness and commitment in championing Africa's cause by making Africa the centrepiece of its foreign policy. Nigeria fought actively for the total liberation and decolonisation of Africa which led to the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Saliu and Omotola, 2015). Nigeria had used several means in this effort, but never participated in the armed struggle against the South

African apartheid regime. Rather, Nigeria used its instrumental role in the creation of the OAU to forge a united front in Africa. Successive Nigerian governments always gave concrete, financial and diplomatic backing to the OAU, now the AU (Saliu and Omotola, 2015). Most of the nations to which Nigeria sent peacekeepers and devoted much in Africa are less developed countries with little or no influence in the UN, OAU/AU and ECOWAS, and Nigeria has limited political interests there. So, one can conclude that Nigeria's peacekeepers were sent to those African states purely on philanthropic grounds under the well-known slogan of 'African Solutions to an African problem'. This is in tandem with the normative reasons for Nigeria's participation in PKOs.

4.3 Normative reasons

For normative reasons, as the largest black nation in the world, Nigeria feels it has the right to participate in PKOs in Africa. It has the conviction that it owes a debt to the entire black people, particularly the Africans. Being that one in every five blacks is a Nigerian, this has made the country to display a 'missionary zeal' and eagerness to secure and speak for the black people. In this regard, Gowon has noted that people of African descent throughout the world see in a stable Nigeria a banner of hope and an instrument for achieving self-respect for the black man (cited in Adebajo, 2010, p.14). Nigeria considers its role in maintaining and promoting peace in Africa a moral duty.

The sentiment is reflected in both government and public opinions concerning the country's involvement in PKOs in Africa. Majority of Nigerians believe that Nigeria's contribution to PKOs is on the basis of no returns. It is depleting its resources without any formal investment or arrangement for recouping what is spent. Many Nigerians believe that it is the idiosyncrasies of the country's leaders and their historical background which influence their decision towards the nation's foreign policy on PKOs in Africa (Personal Interview conducted between June-November, 2016). The UN's first ever military intervention in Africa after its establishment was to protect the newly sovereign young African State of Congo which was invaded by its former colonial master in the disguise of protecting its nationals there. This sent a strong signal to the other newly independent states like Nigeria. So, the nation's efforts in PKOs represent moves in a real sense (Adebajo, 2010). More importantly, the crisis broke out at the time when the Nigerian foreign

policy doctrine was being developed by the newly independent state. Nigeria believed that its participation in PKOs should be a medium through which it will contribute to peace and stability in Africa and the world, in general.

Evidence demonstrates that the notion of brother keepers - that we are all black, and the historical feeling of 'African solution to an African problem' and having experienced similar domination and degradation from colonial rule, has adequately explained the massive support for the enlightened Nigerians for the country's role in PKOs in Africa. Similarly, while describing Nigeria's efforts to bring peace to the sub-region, it has been argued by Abdurrahman (2005) that the driving force has never been monetary. Nor has the desire for international recognition informed the decision to keep the peace. Frankly, Nigeria has expended a great fortune on its PKOs, whether in unilateral peace efforts or within multilateral frameworks instituted by the ECOWAS and the AU by deploying its military personnel and committing a significant part of its revenue to the operations.

4.4 Idiosyncrasies of leaders

Leaders' background is a solid barometer for measuring their performance as well as for measuring their foreign policy direction. When analysing Nigeria's involvement in PKOs in Africa, the psychology of its leaders should also be looked into. Most of them, except for a few, were men with strong military background. They were enrolled into the military when they were under the age of twenty (Personal Interview, conducted between June-November, 2016), hence their psychological make-up is purely militaristic, having also participated in the civil war and seen its effect in Nigeria. The psychological aspect of experiencing war and the desire to quench it before it gets out of hand, and the fear of experiencing it again made such leaders to participate in PKOs.

Leaders' idiosyncrasies with regard to the maintenance of peace and order cannot be ignored. General Babangida, for example, once described these leaders as "practitioners in the art of management of violence" (Personal Interview, conducted between June-November, 2016). Apparently, the military psychology internalises itself entirely and manifests itself in various ways in Nigeria's involvement in PKOs in parts. Additionally, Nigerian leaders, especially those belonging to the first and the second generations who emerged from very high

patriotism, for good or for worse, have firm ideological grounding built along pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and nationalism. This orientation has shaped the leadership styles of Nigerian leaders - be it military or civilian. Scholars such as Sanda (2010), Yoroms (2004) and Adebajo (2013), have described Nigeria's involvement in PKOs as based on the personal ambition of its leaders. As for General Babangida, for instance, the involvement was simply "shaped by his ego, and that he was in peacekeeping because he wanted to keep soldiers busy in Liberia so that they would not overthrow his government in those days" (Personal Interview conducted between June-November, 2016).

Generals Babangida and Abacha are all professional coupists. They were coupists and to prevent anybody from staging a coup against them, they feel "it was desirable for them to create an avenue for the young military, the ambitious men to go and exhibit their skills outside the country" (Personal Interview conducted between June-November, 2016). Moreover, that explains why in the last sixteen years many service chiefs have berated and accused successive governments that came after Shehu Shagari of neglecting the military; a kind of systematic neglect of the army depriving them the necessary armament and training to tinker with the idea of staging a coup. So,

"...definitely it is part of taking off the heat from the polity, and I think they had their field day. For General Obasanjo, it has been argued that apart from his military psychological make-up which impacts on him as a leader and in his foreign policy decision, he was once a combatant in the Congo. He was part of the Nigerian contingent who participated in the peacekeeping effort in the 1960s in the Congo. His experience as a peacekeeper could situate his desire to engage in PKOs, and again just like the current president might be doing, he might try to do the same one thing - that is to please the United States. It is because of Obasanjo's desire to be one of the good boys of Uncle Sam (the United States) in sub-Saharan Africa and not necessarily because of his whims and caprices" (Personal Interview, between June-November, 2016).

5.0 Concluding Remarks

The article examines several rationales for Nigeria's decision to participate in PKOs. In doing so, the article proposed a conceptual framework which includes four categories of factors which have led to Nigeria participating in PKOs, either through deploying its troops,

or providing other resources to conflict spots – economic, political, normative and idiosyncratic factors. The findings revealed that many factors contribute to the country's decision to participate in PKOs which revolve around normative and personal considerations of its leaders. While other considerations may be seen as relevant, they certainly have never been the primary concerns for the country's selfless service in other African countries since her independence in 1960.

Nigeria has very little formal economic interests and low level of formal trade and investment. Due to the lack of official data, the citing of the actual figures in conflicting areas where it has sent scores of peacekeepers and many other material resources has been impossible. Trade volumes of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau could not be reported due to lack of precise data on their trade with Nigeria. In the first quarter of 2017, no African country, including Nigeria's primary trading partner in Africa, South-Africa, made the top ten of Nigeria's trading partner countries. Thus, Nigeria's investment performance plays somewhat an insignificant role in its decision to participate in PKOs in those countries. Remuneration is also not much of an attraction for Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping missions in Africa. Even though to the average officers and soldiers, the compensation may be attractive as they earn higher than their local salary due to the exchange rate, other operations conducted by regional and sub-regional organisations are not as attractive, as we saw Nigeria bearing the costs of its troops and that of other contributing nations as evidenced among others - in the Chad operation in the 1980s, and that of ECOMOG PKOs in the 1990s in the West African Sub-region. It is therefore evident that the Nigerian government, since the Congo operation in the 1960s under the UN rarely pursues economic interests with its peacekeeping roles in Africa.

Nigeria's participation in PKOs has rarely been driven by political considerations either. It does not need to use peacekeeping missions to establish political relationships in Africa. The country has maintained diplomatic ties with all countries in Africa, including South Africa which obtained her independence in 1997 with the end of apartheid to which Nigeria had supported and made huge unilateral contributions in terms of resources, and within the comity of nations – the UN and other international fora. If not because of the current insurgency in the Northeast of the country which led to the Nigerian President touring

the neighbouring countries, such visitations were rarely conducted by Nigerian leaders since independence, especially, to those countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where Nigeria contributed enormously both in human and material resources to resolve conflicts in those countries. Since independence, through diplomatic and other means of conflict resolution initiated by the UN, OAU/AU and later, through the ECOWAS, peacekeeping missions have, to some extent, improved political relations between Nigeria and the hosting countries. However, political consideration is not the only motivating factor for sending its troops to those countries as its relations with those countries before and after the operations have shown.

Normative factors are the most significant in explaining Nigeria's peacekeeping activities in African countries. Nigeria is one of the few countries in the world and the only one in Africa to have been ruled by the military that led an operation to restore power of an ousted military ruler in the name of entrenching democracy. Nigeria was the only country in the world that was indebted with a deficit in infrastructure in all ramifications that could spend USD13 billion in the name of PKOs in another country with which it does not share a border nor have any significant investment in whatever form. The Nigerian public has a sense of commitment to global peace and security, which is rooted in their experience of being black Africans once subjected to colonial domination. PKOs in Africa are therefore, always backed by the majority of the Nigerian public in the name of African culture promoting the idea of one being his brother's keeper.

The case study of Nigerian peacekeeping participation demonstrates that the decision to join PKOs in Africa is mainly based on humanitarian concerns and also driven by idiosyncratic factors. For Nigeria, protecting the dignity of black men and African solution to African problems is part of several normative considerations which promote its national interests. From the theoretical perspective, the Nigerian case demonstrates that normative considerations can be incorporated into national interests, and these can make countries participate in PKOs.

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Appendix

Personal Interview

Anonymous Official A, Defence Headquarters August 2016

Anonymous Official B, Ministry of Defense, Headquarters August 2016

Anonymous Official C, Centre for Strategic Research and Study National War College July 2016

Anonymous Official D, Army Headquarters June 2016

Anonymous Official E, Nigerian Defense Academy September 2016

Anonymous Official F, Kaduna State University, Kaduna October 2016

Anonymous Official G, Nigerian Civil Societies Organisation September 2016

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